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Abstract 
This essay explores the idea of the just which allowed Ricœur to move beyond and expand the “little ethics” 
presented in Oneself as Another. One key development is that he moves beyond the idea of solicitude as a 
kind of benevolent spontaneity on the basis of the insight that not all intersubjective relations are face-to-
face. This recognition that who the other is can be important allows him to show why the just is a notion 
that explicitly arises at the level of the distant and often anonymous other, which is that of social and 
political institutions where the question of justice rather than friendship is central. Another related 
development is that the idea of reciprocity is shown still to fall short of truly mutual recognition. Pursuing a 
just solution to social problems leads to the question of a limited but bounded pluralism and a concomitant 
role for tolerance at the level of society and politics.  
Keywords: Alterity, Justice, Violence, Mutual recognition, Tolerance. 
Résumé 
Cet essai explore l'idée du juste qui a permis à Ricœur d’aller au-delà et d'augmenter la « petite éthique » 
présentée dans Soi-même comme une autre. Un développement principal est qu'il se déplace au delà de l'idée 
de la sollicitude comme spontanéité bienveillante sur la base de une analyse qui monte que les relations 
intersubjectives ne sont pas toutes face à face. Cette reconnaissance de espèces différents dans la notion de 
qui est l’autre lui permet de montrer pourquoi le juste est une notion qui surgit explicitement au niveau des 
autres éloignes et souvent anonymes qui est le niveau de la société et des institutions politiques où la 
question deviens celle de la justice plutôt que l’amitié. Un autre développement important est que ici l'idée 
simple de la réciprocité faite défaut à la reconnaissance véritablement mutuelle. La poursuite du juste mène 
à la question d'un pluralisme limité mais lié et d'un rôle concomitant pour la tolérance au niveau de la 
société et de la politique. 
Mots-clés : Alterité, Justice, Violence, Reconnaissance mutuelle, Tolérance.  
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The discussion of the idea of the just in Ricœur’s late work is important and worth 
discussing for a number of reasons. The fact that that these reflections did not result in a book but 
come to us in essays is one reason why this is so. A second reason is that Ricœur discussed this 
topic from many different angles and in relation to different places where the idea of the just 
plays or can play a role, but he did so without presenting all this material in terms of one 
overarching argument or theory. In these essays, therefore, what we find is a good example of a 
need to think more about what is at issue. This is a conclusion that would have pleased Ricœur, 
who wanted his successors to build on his work, not just to comment on it or seek to explicate it. 
In this essay I intend to do both these things: to say something about Ricœur’s reflections on the 
just and to try at least to begin to think beyond what he left us. I do so in order to point to some 
further questions about what may be involved in looking for the just and to suggest some ways 
in which we can begin to pull together what Ricœur did say about it.1  
Since this is an initial exploration of the topic, I have chosen a more synoptic than a fully-
documented text based approach for my presentation. However I do believe everything I say 
here can be documented or shown to be drawn from Ricœur’s published work—well, maybe not 
everything. I will, in fact, make one, I hope provocative, suggestion in closing that I believe is at 
least implicit in what Ricœur wrote but never so far as I can tell directly stated. I also want to try 
to cover a lot of ground, so these comments will be something less than full-fledged arguments or 
demonstrations of all the points I wish to propose. I hope, however, that readers will see 
programmatic implications in what I shall say and that it will incite them to join me in honoring 
Ricœur by allowing his work to give rise to further thought. 
Exposition 
The first thing that needs to be said is that there is a place for commentary and exposition 
in discussing what Ricœur had to say about the just. This is especially true because his later 
essays are a good illustration of how he worked. I mean by this, of course, his infamous tendency 
to take detours. This was an approach that so frustrates many English speaking philosophers of a 
certain style, who expect one just to make the argument and get to the point, that it has delayed 
an adequate appreciation of his work on their part. But, in fact, Ricœur’s writings on the just are a 
good detour. Like so many of his other detours, they catch sight of and set off to explore either an 
important idea that appeared in an earlier work or a suggestion that was discovered on the basis 
of that earlier work. But they also do more than that. Like so many of his detours, Ricœur’s 
reflections on the question of the just not only amplify something that was left undeveloped at a 
certain point, they also extend and sometimes in an important way revise, or even correct, 
something said earlier. Strikingly, they almost always also anticipate or acknowledge the 
question of the possible limits that apply to what is said. I see these limits and remaining 
questions as further problems left to us to consider and respond to, following his death in 2005. 
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In saying that the essays on the just develop earlier work, I have in mind especially the 
chapters on the “little ethics” in Oneself as Another. It is probably possible to extend this 
investigation back to his earliest work, back so far even as Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and 
the Involuntary,  insofar as, as Ricœur himself recognized, there was an ethical worldview already 
implicit there.2 But that is a task for another, larger investigation. So let me begin from Oneself as 
Another. Ricœur scholars are well aware of what was said in studies seven through nine of that 
work and how it relates to the theme of a philosophical anthropology that runs through Ricœur’s 
philosophy. If the question is, what does it mean, really, to be human?, Ricœur’s answer is, it is to 
be a self, a capable human being, someone who can act as well as know, someone who is capable 
of putting things into language, hence someone who can bind him- or herself for the future 
through promises, someone therefore who is aware of him- or herself as one self among others, 
and therefore someone who lives with and depends upon others. Most importantly, such capable 
human beings have a capacity for reflection. They can think about what they do, what they say, 
and who they are. It is this capacity to reflect that makes critical questioning and new initiatives 
possible, including asking about the nature of that which is said to be just, a just act, agent, or 
situation, for example. And beyond this, reflection allows us to ask what can be said about this 
very notion of the just itself taken as a basic idea or concept. We can do so because our language 
allows us to nominalize—in French one can even say substantialize—the adjective to speak of the 
just as itself a topic of inquiry. These capacities for language and reflection are further what allow 
us to impute our acts to ourselves as well as to others; hence along with what they have to say 
about the just, these capacities are closely tied to the question of our responsibility for what we 
do.3 
To speak more precisely, the ethics spelled out in Oneself as Another has to do with living 
a good life; it is an ethics summed up as the aim of a good life lived with and for others, in just 
institutions.4 There is an internal dialectic that applies here to the teleological idea of the good 
life, the operative normative standards meant to achieve it, and practical wisdom when it comes 
to applying this aim and these norms to concrete situations that actualize this ethics of a good 
life. It is, however, the question of others and institutions more than the details of this dialectic 
that most interest me here. Let me turn therefore to these others. 
In Oneself as Another the reference to life with and for others is immediately explicated 
through the idea of solicitude. This notion is said to unfold the dialogical dimension of self-esteem 
(which itself needs to be balanced by a self-respect that can come only through our relation to 
others).5 This discussion therefore leads to and introduces the theme of reciprocity, which is 
related to the “question of otherness as such.”6 Many commentators on Ricœur’s presentation of 
this ethics have focused on this idea of solicitude as the key to his ethics; we can even say they see 
it as basically constitutive for Ricœur’s ethics. I think this is an overstatement, if not a mistake. It 
is an overstatement if we overlook how the subsequent discussion of the just qualifies solicitude 
and in a way limits it, at least as “benevolent spontaneity” to a few others, those whom we can 
know or meet face to face and who, generally speaking, we can call intimate others: family, 
friends, lovers, neighbors.7 It is a mistake if we take seriously what Ricœur had later to say about 
the just as an answer to the problems of life with others that cannot be answered with solicitude, 
at least not with the solicitude one can extend to such intimate others. In fact, already in Oneself as 
Another, the discussion of solicitude quickly, within two pages, gives way to the question of 
justice, which is a social virtue. Significantly, it is Aristotle’s idea of friendship combined with the 
broader idea of the golden rule that provides the transition here from the few to the many. 
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Friendship, to be sure, as Aristotle said, is always for the sake of the good, and friends do take 
care of one another, even beyond what law or custom may require, so friendship is an illustration 
of what may be involved in solicitude for the other. But as Ricœur points out in the introduction 
to his first collection of essays on the just, friendship is not enough. It is not enough because it is 
“not capable of fulfilling the task of justice.”8 Looking back, we find this judgment was already 
there in Oneself as Another, where we are already told that friendship may not be able to fulfill 
that task, but that “through mutuality” (note the change already from reciprocity), “it borders on 
justice.”9 If we are able to see why this is so, we may also begin to see why the discussion of the 
just extends and revises the little ethics in Oneself as Another. 
Obviously, it is the level of institutions in Oneself as Another that introduces the question 
of the just as a qualifier, an adjective. In fact, Ricœur tells us that it is only in Reflections on the Just 
that he tries to trace this adjective “back to its terminological and conceptual source,” beyond his 
earlier reflections on justice as relating to a moral rule and an institution.10 Given his 
participation in seminars at the Institut des hautes études sur la justice and at the École Nationale 
de la Magistrature, it is the law that drew most of his attention in thinking about justice in this 
sense of a moral rule and also an institution. And we must recognize that the results he obtained 
there are central to his understanding of this more abstract but constitutive notion of the just. But 
the law along with the legal system was not the only area in which he raised the question of the 
just. We can also speak of it in relation to politics, to memory and history, to society overall, and 
even in relation, as already indicated, to the problem of mutual recognition. Before turning to 
these areas, though, I want to say something more about how the later work on the just extends 
and revises the little ethics of Oneself as Another in relation to the question “who is the other?” 
This is worth emphasizing because a more general point to be made about Ricœur’s late 
work has to do with this very idea of the other. Much has been written in the last few decades 
trying to make sense of the idea of alterity, of the other as other, where the goal is not to fall into 
any reduction of otherness to a version of sameness. One thinks here, of course, of Jacques 
Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, or John D. Caputo and others like him who build on the work of 
Derrida and Levinas. One of Ricœur’s great insights and contributions to this discussion is that 
he came to see that otherness is more complex than this discussion might suggest. In a word, not 
all forms of otherness are the same. This is clear, for example, in Memory, History, Forgetting in the 
distinction made between the otherness of the past in contrast to the present.11 Nor is this 
otherness of the past the otherness of other people. A similar point applies to the distinction 
made in that work between the memory image and the imagined one. In relation to our looking 
for the just, the point is that other people are not simply other selves. Yes, they are all selves, 
other selves, but in their relations to one another they differ in significant ways without falling 
into the sameness such an abstract idea of selfhood may suggest. By the time of Reflections on the 
Just, Ricœur came to see this clearly. 
There are places in Ricœur’s work where he found it helpful to think in terms of what I 
would characterize as a Cartesian coordinate system upon which one can map different 
philosophers’ positions; that is, in terms of two intersecting orthogonal axes. One can see this, for 
example, in his work on the imagination, where an axis that runs from absent to present 
intersects one that runs from imaginary to real. Something similar applies in the later work on the 
just. By the time he got to the second collection of essays, Ricœur had seen that he needed to add 
a new axis that crosses the axis already implicit in the three moments of the little ethics. This 
earlier axis turns out to be a vertical one that descends from the good through the obligatory to 
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the fitting. What the new horizontal axis adds are the distinctions that can be made between 
oneself and others I have just referred to, which retrospectively can be seen to be already present 
in the little ethics. That is, there is an axis that maps the relation of the self as an individual to 
other selves by passing through a range that runs from the nearby or intimate, known others, 
who are only a few, to more anonymous others, who are many, to all others, including those in 
the past and the future. This is an axis that not only passes through institutions; it is also a map of 
them since concrete forms of family life and of friendship themselves are always structured in 
dynamic historical and institutional ways. 
I want to say a bit more about this horizontal axis. The range of the few applies to cases 
of at least two being involved to a number that is difficult to specify but that is bounded by the 
notion of intimacy and the possibility of direct action. It involves people who know a lot about 
one another and relations that tend to be face-to-face and ongoing. To use Martin Buber’s 
categories, it is the realm of I-thou relations, a realm of shared experience, shared memories, and 
shared expectations. It is a realm characterized by love, where this is a love that goes beyond the 
self-esteem one may rightly feel for oneself and beyond any simple means-end calculations in 
relation to these intimate others. Solicitude at this level is fundamental but can also be 
spontaneous and go beyond what is expected in responding to the needs of others. At the limit, 
we would do anything for our friends and family, although this obviously needs to be checked 
by our ethical ideal of a good life and our moral norms that follow from it. It is easy to see that 
solicitude in this sense goes beyond self-esteem and even self-respect in that it is directed toward 
an other or some others rather than toward oneself. In some cases, it will even call for self-denial 
and self-sacrifice. 
Next comes the broader range that runs from the few to the many, an interval where we 
move beyond the idea of face-to-face relations and beyond the realm where a simple dialogical 
relation is applicable, even when there are straightforward questions of right and wrong, just and 
unjust, praise and blame to consider. It is the place where we meet the anonymous other, 
someone we may meet and greet occasionally face-to-face—say the clerk at the check-out counter 
in the grocery store or in some government office—but never really get to know in an intimate 
way. At the limit, it includes others whom we will never meet face-to-face. It brings us into 
“society” in all its manifold forms, spheres, and “cities.” It is here that the question of what 
constitutes the just in relation to justice as a social virtue really begins to enter into discussion. 
What is it to be just to such anonymous others (and vice versa, to be dealt with justly by them in 
return)? What is it to speak or act justly at this level? How does the idea of something just apply 
to such a person or persons? Solicitude no longer seems an adequate reply. We may donate to aid 
to the victims of some disaster far away, but there is little we can do directly for them. Even the 
idea of sacrificing ourselves begins to get stretched here in that the object for which one is willing 
to sacrifice oneself changes. One can risk one’s life for one’s country or a better, more just world. 
In fact, a concern for new concepts that we can name as equality, respect, and dignity comes into 
play here, as do the ideas of rights and their assertion and protection. Here too the idea of 
hierarchy as the distinction between those who give orders and those who obey plays a different 
role than it does on the more intimate, face-to-face level, where in fact it is never really absent 
however much it may be damped down, as in the case of friendship. At the limit lies the idea of 
the all, everybody, including our predecessors and successors. This idea of everyone plays at 
least a regulative role in our thinking about not just justice as that which lies between our idea of 
the good and some established social and legal order, but about the very constitutive idea of the 
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just as that which makes justice under a rule of law possible. In the best case, justice would be 
justice for everyone. 
To build on this mapping that locates the self and others in relation to the vertical 
hierarchy of the good, the obligatory, and the fitting of the little ethics, I want now to shift 
perspective a bit to ask: Why does the question of the just as a basic concept arise? That is, when 
do we begin to look for the just? Ricœur’s answer is when we recognize its absence, when we 
experience the unjust and want to cry out, “that’s not fair!” On this basis, we can say that the just 
we seek is that which overcomes or replaces the unjust. This does not mean we must idealize the 
just to the extent of a utopian vision where all problems simply disappear, although as Ricœur’s 
lectures on ideology and utopia showed, there is always a role for a utopian imagination.12 What 
we must say is that when we get close to the universal in relation to the just we are working with 
a regulative not a determinative idea, but it is a regulative idea that responds to an experience of 
the unjust that functions very much like what Kant in his ethics calls a “fact” of reason. To which 
we might add another such fact we today accept, namely, that things continue to change over 
time, so problems are always likely to recur. The limit here, of course, is what Ricœur calls the 
never absent dimension of the tragic that accompanies human existence and actions. 
Part of the difficulty in looking for the just, Ricœur teaches us, I am arguing, comes from 
our tendency to try to reduce everything to the level of the face-to-face, where the answer to the 
unjust lies in dialogue, but dialogue that can only involve a small number, ideally only two even 
if there is an audience. If nothing else the question of scale when we consider society makes this 
impossible. Not everyone can meet face to face, nor can everyone speak, nor can we be solicitous 
to more than a small number of people. Moreover, history shows that a search for an answer to 
unfairness, especially in cases where significant harm is done to oneself or others, can also turn 
into a search for vengeance or the beginning of a blood feud, a demand for an eye for an eye. This 
is something that can happen not only at the level of intimate relations but something that all too 
often occurs at their border where we move beyond the level of everyday intimacy. In the worse 
cases, this search for vengeance can reach to the very many others, when it is directed against 
those who are not us, not like us. The problem with vengeance, of course, is that it is self-
perpetuating and endless. As such, it fails to resolve the problem. Where then ought we to look 
for the just? And when we do look, what do we find? 
Ricœur’s main answer is based on considering the law and the legal system that 
administers and enforces it. The advantage of looking here is that it makes clear the role that can 
be played by a third party to any dispute, for the sake of argument, a judge who will be impartial 
if not always infallible.13 Many important insights follow from thinking about how a just judge 
can reach a just solution to an unjust situation. Thinking about the trial process, meant to lead to 
a just solution, for example, reveals that the trial process is intended to shift the dispute away 
from a search for vengeance by elevating it to the level of language, thereby helping to dampen 
the threat of violence. Reliance on language helps accomplish this by introducing the idea of 
rational argument into the process. But argument here, while meant to be rational, is not 
mechanical or merely deductive, and it always leaves room for rhetoric in both the good and the 
bad senses of this term. Legal arguments are based on allegations regarding both the law and the 
alleged injustice. They are rule-governed but disputable appeals as to what can count as 
evidence, so nothing is settled until the final judgment is reached. Finding the just, we must 
therefore say, depends upon judgment, which cuts off the argument by imposing a solution.14 
This solution is one meant to establish or re-establish a just distance between the parties involved. 
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It is this idea of a just distance that forms the core of Ricœur’s idea of the just by deriving it from 
and connecting it back to the self-other relation. In the best cases, all the parties involved, 
including any audience, will recognize this just distance and accept it. In practice, we may think 
this is unlikely to occur in criminal trials, as it is not likely many criminals willingly accept their 
sentence, but we are talking about the operative idea here. On this level of disputes within the 
law, it is also easy to see that there is already a possible connection to the question of just 
recognition, which for Ricœur would be a form of mutual recognition, an idea that will continue 
to accompany us in what follows. 
In fact, from Ricœur’s last book on recognition, we can propose an addition to the idea of 
a just distance as a necessary condition for defining the just. This would be that a just distance 
and mutual recognition establish or reestablish a state of peace. Ricœur, unfortunately, did not 
have time to fully develop what he meant by a state of peace in The Course of Recognition, but I 
would suggest that by drawing on its application in the law court we can say that what is at stake 
is not simply peace between the parties involved, but also peace as regards society as a whole. In 
this sense, a just solution is one that reaches beyond the specific problem or situation to the level 
of society as a whole that finally depends on a willingness of those who live within it to live 
together. This willing to live together, too, is a theme that shall accompany us in what follows as 
we move beyond the setting of the law court to the larger one of politics. 
Thinking More 
First, however, I want to note two boundary questions that arise already at within the 
legal system, of which Ricœur was aware but not able to resolve. The first one stems from the 
idea of punishment. Ricœur had discussed this in The Just in the essay titled “Sanction, 
Rehabilitation, Pardon” as a practical question regarding the reintegration of the punished 
person into society, a question that involves more than recognition (in the form of a legal 
acknowledgement) that the criminal has paid society’s penalty. It comes up again in a much more 
radical form in an essay that was not included in either of the two volumes on the just, but 
published in the L’Herne volume devoted to him. Significantly, that essay is titled “Le juste, la 
justice et son échec” (“The Just, Justice, and its Failure”).15 The problem is that as a basic notion 
the idea of the just should be able to justify itself. For Ricœur, it does so to a certain extent as the 
idea of the good considered in terms of the relationship of oneself to others and through its 
convertibility with other basic concepts or transcendental ideas.16 Yet justice in practice is never 
able to justify in a convincing way its right to punish someone. It cannot do so because it cannot 
overcome the paradox that the solution to the suffering of one party should be further suffering 
imposed on another, the guilty party. In a word, it is the problem of violence that reappears here, a 
topic I shall have more to say about in a moment. All that can be said regarding the normative 
world of a legal system is that the justice that works in practice there is not founded on pure 
reason, not even on pure practical reason, but rather on a shared willingness to live together that 
makes society possible, in other words, on shared convictions, customs, and traditions—and at 
the limit the glimmer of the idea of a universally applicable reason. This is a conclusion that 
along with the second boundary question that arises in regard to the law points us ahead to the 
question of the just in relation to politics, where politics as the realm that encompasses all the 
other spheres of society while being one among them can stand for all of them. 
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This second boundary is close to the paradox of imposed suffering in that it is the 
problem of what is it that gives a third party, whether an individual or an institution, the 
authority to pass judgment?  In terms of the larger political order, it is the well-known problem of 
what legitimates sovereignty. So while looking at the law and the legal system give us important 
insights into the nature of the just, as involving a just distance and social peace, and even 
something that can approach mutual recognition, the law and the legal system serve more to 
illustrate what we mean by the just rather than to fully justify it as a concept. 
A similar point can be made about the political order. To show this fully it would be 
necessary to return to Ricœur’s important earlier work on the political paradox and the fragility 
of political discourse, which long antedate the little ethics of Oneself as Another.17 I can put it 
briefly, however, by pointing to a few salient facts about the political order. First, it is a realm that 
is essentially a site of contestation. One can argue not only about whether a particular law should 
be enacted, but also about whether any law at all is required, as well as about the very form of 
government, even whether there should be a government at all. Obviously, in one sense the idea 
of something just is meant to be a solution to all these challenges. But I have already also 
mentioned the problem of the status of authority, which when we ask about specifically political 
authority, Ricœur says, “shifts the axis of discussion from the properly moral problematic to a 
more precisely civil one.”18 It does so because “the accent is shifted from the force of moral 
constraint, constitutive of moral obligation, to that of social, psychological, political constraint 
that is constitutive of the power to make oneself obeyed.”19 This is a particular problem in the 
modern world because solutions that earlier worked, which Ricœur characterizes as systems 
based on declared or asserted authority, no longer hold sway once we say that political authority 
issues from the will of a sovereign people. And it is not simply a question of legitimating this 
new authority. It also has to be inscribed as a fact. This is a problem that takes many forms linked 
to the question of representation, usually in relation to elections. Ricœur also sees it as linked to 
the question of how to connect another set of intersecting axes: the horizontal one of wanting to 
live together and the vertical one of domination, what Max Weber called Herrschaft. In effect, it is 
a problem that combines in varying ways the ideas of status and power to give them sufficient 
symbolic force to function effectively. 
The idea of the just as providing a solution to these problems is also an indication of the 
limits of any concrete instantiation of this idea. I would explain this by saying that the idea of the 
just in the sense for which Ricœur is looking lies at the intersection of the universal and the 
historical. This is why it can be given a dialectical interpretation if we are willing to turn this 
notion of an intersection into one of mediation, in Ricœur’s sense that any mediating term has to 
be shown to be able not only to connect but to move back and forth between the poles. I think it 
was something like this dialectic that Ricœur was seeking in his own reflections on the just. I 
make no claim to be able to spell out fully this dialectic here, instead I want to consider two more 
points in our search for the just. The first has to do with what limits this dialectic, by surrounding 
it; I mean, the possibility and reality of violence. The second will take us to my suggestion 
mentioned earlier about an idea that may take us beyond what Ricœur was able to say about 
looking for the just. 
Ricœur did not often speak of violence, but when he did it is clear that it is one of the 
indications of the limits of the just. An important early short essay from 1967, “Violence and 
Language,” makes this clear.20 There he sets the reality of violence, as the title indicates, in 
opposition to language. Hence it is human violence that is really at issue. Nature can be 
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destructive, but it is cases of violence directed against us through the force of language that tells 
us this is the case. The real problem of violence comes rather when we add the “violence of 
desire, of fear, of hate,” violence that is intended to dominate if not eliminate the other.21 
Ricœur’s great insight is that saying this, naming it as violence, already points us toward the 
opposite pole, language that can refuse or overcome such destructiveness, as we have seen in 
relation to the court of law. Ricœur believed this can be seen in the case of any argument in favor 
of violence. To argue for violence, he says, is to contradict oneself in that the argument itself 
commits us to language understood as a search for meaning, itself understood in a non-violent 
sense. Why is this so? It is because such discourse always has an implicit goal. That goal is 
meaning in the sense of making sense of things, whether that be our own existence, other human 
beings, or the worldhood constitutive of our very being in the world. But no one, Ricœur says, 
ever fully possesses, that is, owns or takes control of such discourse, if only because the very idea 
of possession already tips us back toward the side of violence and domination.22 
Implications 
What lessons are we to draw from this? They are both theoretical and practical. On the 
theoretical side, we need always to remember and bear witness to language’s search for meaning, 
not as some externally imposed end, another form of domination, but as the “full manifestation 
of the orientation” of language’s own internal dynamism. Similarly, any turning of the demands 
of reason into merely instrumental reason will be a concession to violence. This is so because 
there is no objectivity without subjectivity, and any understanding that leaves out the subject, 
which concretely is the self, will leave the door open either to “an anarchic and violent 
affirmation of the subject,” on the one hand, or its denial, on the other.23 More practically, Ricœur 
already in 1967, thirty-some years before his reflections on the just, counseled the necessity to 
always bear witness to this close tie between violence and language, yet also to their fundamental 
opposition. In light of what was said earlier, this suggests that the just also has a mediating role 
to play here, between violence and language. Beyond this, though, Ricœur adds a further limit, 
the prohibition of murder, even while admitting that sometimes, as in times of war, violence can 
be necessary. The real test is whether even in war an act would make peace impossible. Echoing 
Max Weber, without explicitly naming him, he concedes that this little ethics of non-violence is 
itself an ideal, by saying that what Weber called an ethics of conviction can never take the place 
of that of responsibility. But then he adds another note, one that is directly applicable to our 
reflections on the just today. Recognizing the possible non-violent practice of discourse itself, 
Ricœur says, requires us “to respect the plurality and diversity of languages” themselves, 
including those of instrumental reason and abstract calculation.24 
 Here I think is the origin of the idea that so fascinates Richard Kearney of the need for 
what can be called linguistic hospitality. To conclude, I want to go further than Kearney, 
however, and suggest that in light of what Ricœur was to say about the just, in all its senses, what 
more is required is a kind of moral hospitality. This is a hospitality that would acknowledge—and 
accept—the existence of differing conceptions of the good life if only as the very condition of 
possibility of living together in a pluralistic world. This is not the place to make a detailed 
argument for this suggestion. However, it seems to be heuristically plausible if we ask one more 
time how looking for the just extends and revises Ricœur’s little ethics. Looking back, we can 
recognize that it was in fact human plurality that set this search in motion. Along the way that 
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plurality began to tip over into the recognition that plurality today—actually, always—has also 
meant a bounded pluralism in the sense that there can be a number of different and competing 
ideas about the good life, lived with and for others in just institutions. Again, it is the use of 
violence as an unnecessary use of force meant to dominate others that indicates a limit, if not the 
limit, to such pluralism and the concomitant tolerance it implies. Recognizing this fact—and 
doing so willingly and even gladly25—suggests that in the end search for the just turns into the 
question of tolerance. This too is a topic that brings the question of limits into play. Should we 
say with John Rawls that the question only really applies to liberal democracies and the 
assumption of a workable overlapping consensus? An even harder question arises if, with 
Ricœur, we acknowledge that any instantiation of the idea of the just does not remove once and 
for all the threat, much less the reality, of violence. The tragic dimension of human action never 
really ever disappears, although it may be possible to live in light of the hope that it one day 
will.26 
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